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P.: Federal Courts--Jurisdiction of Trespass and False Imprisonment
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

this would be the best solution to this question, it is obviously a
problem which can only be solved by appropriate congressional
action.
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falsely imprisoned by a municipal officer, brought
suit in United States district court, pleading a violation of rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, as implemented by the
civil rights statute, to establish federal jurisdiction in the absence
of diversity of citizenship. Held, sustaining the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, that P had not pleaded sufficient
facts to: show "state action" to warrant federal court jurisdiction.
Dinneen v. Williams, 219 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1955).
The court distinguishes the principal case from Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946), saying that where federal officers are involved
a more sketchy statement of facts will suffice. Bell v. Hood held
that federal courts have jurisdiction of a suit when the plaintiff
chooses to base his claim on the violation of a right having its
foundation in the United States Constitution and amendments
although the action was one generally cognizable in the state courts
and the only remedy available would be under state law. Bell
v. Hood involved a transgression by federal officers but this should
not distinguish the cases as the basis of that court's decision was
not the capacities of the officers involved but the foundation of the
right violated.
The plaintiff in the principal case claimed under the fourteenth
amendment, since the offense was committed by a municipal officer,
whereas in Bell v. Hood the claim was made under the fourth and
fifth amendments, since the trespass was committed by federal
officers. The court, in the principal case, is possibly distinguishing
the two cases on this basis. The court stated that plaintiff must
plead sufficient facts to show "state action". What it means by this
is not too lear. The pleading mentions the Civil Rights Statute,
62 STAT. 932 (1948), 28 U.S.C. 1343 (1951), but this should not
require the plaintiff to show the violation occurred under color
of statute, ordinance, custom or usage of the state. Presumably,
the court by "state action" means that the pleading must show
that the violation was an act of the state, since the officer involved
was a municipal officer. This should not be necessary. It should
be sufficient to show only that the right violated has its foundation
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in the fourteenth amendment. That amendment states: "No
state shall . . .", but this does not limit the federal courts' jurisdic-

tion to violations by state legislatures. It does not limit the right
guaranteed by the amendment. The United States Supreme Court
in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879), held that, whoever, by
virtue of public position under a state government, deprives another of life, liberty or property without due process of law violates
the constitutional inhibition and his act is that of the state. The
Supreme Court in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 266 (1897), held that the fourteenth amendment applies
to all agencies of the state. The fifteenth amendment uses the same
language as the fourteenth amendment but the Court has consistently held that the right to vote has its foundation in the Constitution and its amendments and has never required facts showing
"state action" to secure federal court jurisdiction. Wiley v. Sinkler,
179 U.S. 58 (1900), and Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
Obviously, the principal case cannot be distinguished from Bell
v. Hood on the ground that the fourteenth amendment requires
a showing of "state action" as opposed to the fourth and fifth
amendments which require only sufficient facts to show the existence
of the violation.
The plaintiff in the principal case manifestly based his claim
on the fourteenth amendment to gain jurisdiction in the federal
court. The claim was not frivolous, as it stated a transgression of
a right having its foundation in the Constitution and amendments.
The plaintiff's pleading was designed to enable him to bring his
case in a federal court, although it was an action usually brought
in a state court. The plaintiff is the architect of his own pleading
and has this choice. Bell v. Hood. Had the court followed this
doctrine it appears that it should have taken jurisdiction of the
principal case. The case is indicative of the tendency of the federal

courts to limit their jurisdiction by distinguishing cases on the
slightest provocation, thereby making it more difficult for the
pleader to substantiate jurisdiction in the federal court in absence
of diversity of citizenship.
J. W. P.
GAMING-SLOT MACHINES AS GAmING Dvicrs UNDER WEST
VIRGINIA STATUTE.-D was indicted under W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 10,
§ 1 (Michie 1955), for keeping and exhibiting a gaming device.
The device in question, a slot machine of the general type known as

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss1/13

2

